Commentary: Last-ditch effort for US support leaves Ukraine with few options

BIRMINGHAM, England: Winter is coming in Ukraine, for the third time amid its war with Russia. And if Ukraine’s prospects were not rosy before President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s trip to the United States last week, they are outright bleak given its results.
Mr Zelenskyy went to engage world leaders at the United Nations and to meet with US President Joe Biden, as well as his prospective successors Vice President Kamala Harris and ex-president Donald Trump.
Two main items were on his agenda: Shoring up support at the UN for his peace plan and getting the US to support his strategy for victory in the war against Russia. On both items, the results are mixed at best, further compounding Ukraine’s already precarious situation.
At the UN, Mr Zelenskyy made a passionate appeal in his speeches to the General Assembly and the Security Council for forcing Russia to make peace on the basis of the core principles of the UN Charter – restoring Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1991, internationally recognised boundaries – which would require the full withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.
Given the current situation on the battlefield and the steady – albeit slow and costly – gains Russia has been making over the past several months, this is clearly a non-starter for Moscow.
An alternative joint initiative by China and Brazil, launched last June just before the Swiss-hosted first so-called global peace summit on Ukraine, envisages a ceasefire along the current frontlines. This would freeze the current status quo and leave it up to subsequent negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv to find a settlement that may, or may not, restore Ukraine in its 1991 boundaries.
Ukraine and its Western partners find this equally unacceptable. Add to that the fact that the Russian President Vladimir Putin has made any negotiations contingent on Ukraine recognising the illegal Russian annexation not only of Crimea in 2014 but also of four regions on the Ukrainian mainland that Russia only partially occupies at the moment, and any talk about negotiations, let alone an actual settlement, is pure fantasy.
The problem with Mr Zelenskyy’s victory plan seems to be that it is not much of a plan.
It centres on the delivery of more Western military aid, permission to use long-range missiles against targets deep inside Russia, and an official invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
While Mr Zelenskyy managed to get Mr Biden to authorise a total of US$8 billion in further security assistance, no progress has been made on lifting restrictions that the US and other allies are placing on Ukraine’s use of Western military aid against Russian territory. The prospect of Ukraine joining NATO remains remote, not least as it would require the consent of all 32 current member states.
The renewed nuclear sabre rattling by Mr Putin, who announced changes to Russia’s military doctrine on the use of its nuclear arsenal on Sep 26, just before Mr Zelenskyy’s meeting with Mr Biden, was clearly timed as a signal to the West to think twice: How much support to Ukraine might be too much?
The actual changes may be few and far between but they will create enough uncertainty in Western policy circles to continue the current course of self-deterrence that provides just enough aid to Ukraine to avoid a military defeat at Russian hands.
Equally concerning from a Ukrainian point of view is the prospect of a return of Donald Trump to the White House after the presidential elections in the US on Nov 5. A Zelenskyy-Trump meeting did eventually take place at the tail end of the trip, but only after much acrimony in the run-up to it.
Unsurprising, but still deeply disconcerting for Ukraine is the fact that Trump continues to envisage that he “can work out something that’s good for both sides”, implying a deal between Moscow and Kyiv that would see Ukraine make significant territorial concessions to Russia and potentially close off any route to NATO, and possibly even European Union, membership.
Such an outcome looks indistinguishable from what would likely result if the joint proposal by China and Brazil were to be pursued. Either outcome would substantially reward Russia for its aggression against Ukraine.
Taken together, the lukewarm support for his victory plan and the certain prospect of a very unfavourable negotiated settlement leave Mr Zelenskyy with few options but to struggle on and avoid an outright military defeat. Achieving even this minimal outcome will be difficult.
The momentum on the battlefield, if slow, remains with Russia. Mr Zelenskyy’s risky gamble of invading Russia’s Kursk region in early August has not really paid off. Ukrainian units that would otherwise be available to hold the line against Russian advances in Donbas are tied down in Kursk still holding on to most of the ground seized in August but under heavy pressure by Russian counter attacks.
Ukraine continues to lack materiel and manpower, while Russia remains well-supplied by Iran and North Korea and has just announced a further enlargement of its armed forces by 180,000 combat troops.
Moreover, relentless Russian attacks against Ukraine’s energy network over the past months have caused substantial damage that the country has found difficult to repair. Lacking in adequate air defence capabilities, this is unlikely to improve anytime soon and does not bode well for the morale of Ukrainian civilians during the coming winter months.
This is also likely to have a knock-on effect on frontline troops who are already affected by low morale after a gruelling more than two-and-a-half years of war.
The best that can be hoped for is now that Kyiv and Washington, and the wider network of Western supporters, recognise that the aspirations for a defeat of the Russian aggression and the reality of it being possible on the basis of current strategies are dangerously far apart. It is not too late yet to change course on the path towards otherwise almost inevitable disaster, but time to do so is running out fast.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.